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ARTICLES
THE POACHER, THE SOVEREIGN CITIZEN, THE
MOONLIGHTER, AND THE DENTURISTS:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INALIENABLE
RIGHTS IN MONTANA
Thomas J. Bourguignon*
The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for, among old parch-
ments or musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole
volume of human nature, by the hand of divinity itself, and can never be
erased or obscured by mortal power.
—Alexander Hamilton1
Deep-seated preferences can not be argued about — you can not argue a man
into liking a glass of beer . . . . The jurists who believe in natural law seem to
me to be in that naı¨ve state of mind that accepts what has been familiar and
accepted by them and their neighbors as something that must be accepted by
all men everywhere.
—Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes2
* Thomas J. Bourguignon is an associate attorney at Maclay Law Firm in Missoula, Montana. He
wrote an early draft of this article as a third-year law student for Professor Anthony Johnstone’s course
on Montana Constitutional Law. Thomas is grateful to Professor Johnstone and Lucas Hamilton for their
many helpful comments. Thomas is also grateful to the editorial board and staff of the Montana Law
Review for their assistance with this article.
1. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, The Farmer Refuted & c., in THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
81, 122 (Harold C. Syrett ed., (1961) (emphasis in original).
2. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918).
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Poacher
On March 3, 1939, C.R. Rathbone gunned down a wild elk that was
part of a herd eating feed on Rathbone’s ranch near Augusta, Montana.3
Hunting season was over; the act was in clear violation of regulations
promulgated by the Fish and Game Commission.4 Rathbone had, on many
previous occasions, contacted state and federal authorities in an attempt to
obtain relief from the damage caused by the elk, but no action had been
taken.5
At trial, the State proved that Rathbone had shot the elk and then
rested its case.6 Rathbone was convicted in justice court for killing a game
animal out of season.7 He appealed to the district court for a new jury trial.
The district judge did not permit Rathbone to introduce evidence showing
that the act was necessary to defend his property.8 Rathbone appealed, argu-
ing that his “inalienable [right] . . . [of] protecting property” was infringed
by the regulation and that the district judge erred in not instructing the jury
about justifiable use of force in protecting property.9 In a unanimous deci-
sion, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the district court and ordered a
new trial, stating the right “to acquire, hold, and protect property is . . . as
old as the common law itself. Its origin antedates by many years the guar-
anty contained in Magna Charta.”10
B. The Sovereign Citizen
On May 29, 1985, Rodney Skurdal was pulled over for speeding in
Billings, Montana.11 The police officer asked Skurdal for his driver’s li-
cense and registration; Skurdal replied by asking “by what authority” the
officer was asking for such documents.12 Skurdal refused to produce a li-
cense or registration and told the officer the Constitution did not require
him to do so.13 Skurdal refused to exit his car voluntarily, ultimately result-
ing in two officers pulling him from the vehicle. .14 Not surprisingly, a jury
3. State v. Rathbone, 100 P.2d 86, 88 (Mont. 1940).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 90.
6. Id. at 88.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Rathbone, 100 P.2d at 90.
10. Id. (quoting Herlihy v. Donohue, 161 P. 164, 165 (Mont. 1916)).
11. City of Billings v. Skurdal, 730 P.2d 371, 372 (Mont. 1986) [hereinafter Skurdal I].
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
2
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found Skurdal guilty of speeding, having no proof of insurance, and ob-
structing a peace officer.15 The Montana Supreme Court spent little time in
affirming the jury verdict and denying Skurdal’s constitutional claims.16
Not long after that incident, Skurdal was pulled over for speeding
again, this time in Big Horn County, Montana.17 Skurdal did not have a
driver’s license and was unwilling to post a bond—thus, the officer arrested
him.18 A jury convicted Skurdal of speeding and operating a motor vehicle
without a valid driver’s license.19 Skurdal appealed, appearing pro se and
submitting a handwritten brief that made a number of constitutional argu-
ments.20 Skurdal’s brief “was not properly filed” and had many “irregulari-
ties”; even so, the Court chose to issue an opinion and did not require a
reply brief from the State.21
Skurdal argued that he was a “free man” and had “no contracts” with
the state or federal governments.22 He argued that the right to travel, al-
though not expressly referenced in the Montana Constitution, is an inaliena-
ble right and that it could not be revoked simply by his failure to obtain a
valid license.23 Skurdal’s argument was an extension of the sentiment ex-
pressed by Alexander Hamilton, reprinted at the beginning of this article:
his right to travel is one of the “sacred rights” written by a higher power.24
A unanimous Court did not agree with him: citing State v. Rathbone,25 the
Court observed that “police power exists even when the regulations are an
15. Id. at 372–373.
16. Id. at 373.
17. State v. Skurdal, 767 P.2d 304, 306 (Mont. 1988) [hereinafter Skurdal II].
18. Id. at 307–308.
19. Id. at 306.
20. Id. Skurdal’s arguments included the following, as restated by the Court: “it is unconstitutional
for the State to require him to procure a driver’s license before operating a motor vehicle on the public
highways” and that “his constitutional right to freedom of travel and right to use his private property”
was violated, Skurdal II, 767 P.2d at 306; that “his right to liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was
violated when the Montana Highway Patrol stopped his vehicle and detained him personally,” Skurdal
II, 767 P.2d at 307; that “he is a ‘free man’ exempt from the laws because he has ‘no contracts’ with
either the state or federal governments,” Skurdal II, 767 P.2d at 308; “that because he owes nothing on
his car (private property) and is not engaged in commercial travel, his liberty interests are infringed by
stopping his vehicle,” Skurdal II, 767 P.2d at 308; that his rights were violated because the officer did
not give him a Miranda warning at the time of the traffic stop, Skurdal II, 767 P.2d at 308; that his
constitutional right to counsel was violated because he was not appointed the counsel of his choice, even
if his choice is an individual who is not an attorney, Skurdal II, 767 P.2d at 308; and, finally, that the
fine imposed on him was improper because Federal Reserve Notes are not “dollars,” Skurdal II, 767
P.2d at 309.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 308.
23. Skurdal II, 767 P.2d at 306–307.
24. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 122. R
25. 100 P.2d 86 (Mont. 1940).
3
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infringement of individual rights.”26 The Court opined that following
Skurdal’s arguments would be “an invitation to anarchy.”27
C. The Moonlighter
On February 16, 1990, Shannon Wadsworth, a longtime real estate ap-
praiser for the State of Montana’s Department of Revenue, was fired.28 The
reason for Wadsworth’s termination was his knowing and continued viola-
tion of a departmental rule, promulgated in 1981, that prohibited real estate
appraisers from engaging in independent work on the side.29
Wadsworth filed a wrongful discharge suit, arguing that he had an ina-
lienable right to pursue life’s basic necessities, which includes the right to
the opportunity to seek employment. The district judge denied summary
judgment for the State and sent the case to a jury. The jury found for Wad-
sworth, awarding him $85,000 in damages.30 The State appealed the jury
verdict, arguing the State’s need to regulate its appraisers trumped Wad-
sworth’s inalienable right. The Montana Supreme Court disagreed with the
district court’s denial of summary judgment because the issue “was a legal
issue containing no implicit questions of fact.”31 Still, the Court unani-
mously concluded the jury had gotten it right and the department’s anti-
moonlighting rule violated Wadsworth’s inalienable rights.32 In doing so,
the Court—following a theory almost as expansive as that expressed by
Alexander Hamilton—created a new inalienable right: the right to the op-
portunity to pursue employment.
D. The Denturists
In 1985, the Montana Legislature passed a statute “requiring denturists
to refer partial denture patients to dentists ‘as needed.’”33 Because “as
needed” was vague, the state Board of Dentistry (which had authority over
dentists and denturists) promulgated a regulation (the “Partial Denture
Rule”) requiring denturists to “refer all partial denture patients to dentists
before providing partial denture services.”34 In 1995, the Court held the
26. Skurdal II, 767 P.2d at 306 (citing Rathbone, 100 P.2d at 92).
27. Id. at 308.
28. Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165, 1168 (Mont. 1996).
29. Id. at 1167–1168.
30. Id. at 1168–1169.
31. Id. at 1171.
32. Id. at 1175–1176. The Court was unanimous as to the result; however, two justices wrote spe-
cial concurrences taking issue with different aspects of the Court’s holding. The majority opinion only
received four votes.
33. Wiser v. State, Dept. of Commerce, 129 P.3d 133, 136 (Mont. 2006).
34. Id. at 136.
4
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Partial Denture Rule was a valid interpretation of the statute;35 however, the
Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the Partial Denture Rule.36 The
denturists sued again, arguing the Partial Denture Rule was an unconstitu-
tional violation of the right to privacy and the right to pursue life’s basic
necessities.37
The first sentence of the Court’s opinion stated, “The long struggle
between denturists and dentists is well documented in the annals of the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Montana government.”38
The Court then held that neither the right of privacy, nor the right to pursue
employment described in Wadsworth, were grounds to strike down the Par-
tial Denture Rule.39 Citing Rathbone and Skurdal, the Court concluded the
state’s police power authorized the regulation.40 Thus, it did not matter
whether the denturists’ rights had been infringed because the state had the
authority to infringe those rights. The Court’s reaction to the denturists’
argument was similar to the sentiment expressed by Justice Holmes, quoted
at the beginning of this article: those who believe in the existence of a
universal, natural law are “in [a] naı¨ve state of mind.”41
Why did C.J. Rathbone and Shannon Wadsworth prevail on their
claims when Rodney Skurdal and the denturists did not? Are there general
rules that can be divined from the Court’s decisions on the many claims of
violations of inalienable rights? Does the Court enforce these rights consist-
ently?
A contradiction lies at the heart of any inalienable rights provision in a
written constitution. Inalienable rights are natural rights that are inherent
and exist prior to, and separate from, any written laws.42 According to Al-
exander Hamilton’s theory, inalienable rights do not need to be found
“among old parchments, or musty records” because they are written “by the
hand of divinity itself.”43 However, the more modern, positivist theory is
that there are no universal, natural laws—or as Justice Holmes said, “you
can not argue a man into liking a glass of beer . . . .”44
35. Christenot v. State, 901 P.2d 545, 548–549 (Mont. 1995).
36. Wiser, 129 P.3d at 136 (discussing Christenot, 901 P.2d at 549).
37. Id. at 137–138.
38. Id. at 136.
39. Id. at 137–139.
40. Id. at 138 (citing Rathbone, 100 P.2d at 92; Skurdal II, 767 P.2d at 306).
41. Holmes, supra note 2, at 41. R
42. Thomas B. McAffee, Inalienable Rights, Legal Enforceability, and American Constitutions:
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Concept of Unenumerated Rights, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 747,
748–749 (2001).
43. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 122. R
44. Holmes, supra note 2, at 41. R
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Most state constitutions include a section on inalienable rights;45 how-
ever, the inclusion of a list of inalienable rights appears to be self-defeating.
For instance, why codify rights that exist outside of any attempt at codify-
ing law? Isn’t there a risk of leaving some of them out? Why not just state
in the constitution, “All humans have inalienable rights,” and allow the
courts to define what those rights are?
And what happens when a state chooses to draft its inalienable rights
provision as Montana has: with a fairly long and specific list of enumerated
inalienable rights?46 Is Article II, section 3 of the Montana Constitution a
recognition of universal and unchangeable tenets of natural law, as stated
by Hamilton; or is it positive law, as Justice Holmes would argue, enacted
by a particular group of delegates at a particular time? When it comes to the
Court’s difficult choice between enacted laws and inalienable rights, clearly
some balance is needed. If the Court enforced every natural law right as-
serted by the Rodney Skurdals of the world, society would be strained by
conduct against which the rule of law could not operate. However, if the
Court upheld every statute to the very letter of the law, convicting the C.R.
Rathbones of the world no matter how good their justification, then we the
people would be powerless to defend ourselves against the tyranny of the
majority as represented by the legislature.
The purpose of this article is to present a descriptive account of how
constitutional delegates at the Montana Constitutional Convention of 1972
and Montana courts have interpreted the inalienable rights provision and the
unenumerated rights provision. This article will not make normative argu-
ments about how the constitutional clauses should have been drafted, or
how courts should interpret them; rather, it will examine how courts actu-
ally have interpreted them.
Section II of this article will provide background on inalienable rights
provisions prior to the 1972 Montana Constitution. Section III will provide
background on the 1972 Montana Constitution and how courts have inter-
preted it. Section IV will examine each clause and phrase of the inalienable
rights provision separately. This article will observe that the delegates to the
1972 Montana Constitution viewed inalienable rights as universal, natural
rights that were merely being recognized (not created) in the constitutional
text. In contrast to the delegates’ expansive view of inalienable rights, how-
ever, Montana courts have tended to apply a positivist interpretation to ina-
lienable rights and have enforced the rights expressly included in the Mon-
tana Constitution because they appear in the text and not because they are
natural law rights.
45. McAffee, supra note 42, at 748.
46. Montana’s inalienable rights provision includes five clauses and a total of about eight distinct
rights. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
6
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CODIFICATION OF INALIENABLE RIGHTS
Eight hundred years ago, King John of England deprived his people of
rights with such frequency and intensity that the nobility rose up against
him and forced him to sign a charter subsequently known as Magna Carta,
granting rights from the king to the people.47 One famous passage of Magna
Carta has served as the precursor to many inalienable rights provisions:
Chapter 39. No free man shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, outlawed, ban-
ished, or in any way destroyed, nor will We proceed against or prosecute him,
except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land.48
Magna Carta’s due process or inalienable rights provision has been
characterized in two manners: first, as the Seventeenth Century legal
scholar Edward Coke argued, Magna Carta was a restatement of even more
ancient positive laws already in place in England; and second, as early
Americans and the framers of the Constitution argued, Magna Carta was an
attempt at codifying or incorporating natural law concepts.49
American colonists used passages of Magna Carta in some early colo-
nial governments. For instance, the Concessions and Agreements of West
New Jersey, dated March 13, 1677, stated,
That no Proprietor, freeholder or inhabitant of the said Province of West New
Jersey, shall be deprived or condemned of life, limb, liberty, estate, property
or any ways hurt in his or their privileges, freedoms or franchises . . . .50
The Declaration and Resolves [of the First Continental Congress],
dated October 14, 1774 stated,
That the inhabitants of the English colonies in North-America, by the immu-
table laws of nature . . . have the following RIGHTS: . . . That they are
entitled to life, liberty and property . . . .51
Such statements of inalienable rights became regular provisions to in-
clude in charters and constitutions during the Revolutionary Era. The Vir-
ginia Declaration of Rights, dated June 7, 1776, and drafted principally by
George Mason, used language that would be highly influential to states in
drafting their constitutions:
That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot,
by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of
47. A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 8, 10 (1964).
48. Id. at 43.
49. J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 15 (1965).
50. NEIL H. COGAN, CONTEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY COLLECTION ON PRINCI-
PLES OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 677 (1999) (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
7
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life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.52
Perhaps the most famous formulation of inalienable rights is from the
second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence, drafted principally by
Thomas Jefferson:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness . . . .53
The Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution departed from Jef-
ferson’s phrasing and used a phrase more similar to the one used by the
First Continental Congress. The Fifth Amendment states, “No person shall
. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
. . . .”
54
Inspired by these foundational documents, the states drafted inaliena-
ble rights provisions in their respective constitutions. This article will not
attempt to exhaustively explain the differences between the various states’
manners of expressing inalienable rights.55 It will note, where relevant,
which state constitutions were used as source material during the drafting of
Montana’s Constitutions of 1884, 1889, and 1972. This article will not at-
tempt to catalogue the history of the framing of the Montana Constitution in
1884, 1889, and 1972—that history has been well-documented elsewhere.56
Most states used natural law principles in inserting inalienable rights
provisions into their constitutions.57 But do the court systems tend to en-
force those principles as natural rights, or do courts enforce only the literal
text? Legal scholar R.A. Helmholz recounts Randy Barnett’s quip that two
things are true of natural law: everyone believes in it, and it makes no dif-
52. Id. at 30 (emphasis added). Note the use of “namely” before the “inherent rights.” This creates a
closed list—only those rights specifically enumerated are included. As discussed in Section III of this
article, Montana’s inalienable rights provision is an open list, stating that the people’s inalienable rights
“include” the following rights.
53. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Unlike the Virginia Declaration of
Rights, the Declaration of Independence creates an open list of rights by stating that the three rights
enumerated are “among” the inalienable rights possessed by the people.
54. U.S. CONST. amend V. Note that the Fifth Amendment, because of its use of “or,” is a closed
list of rights.
55. For a broader context on the development of inalienable rights in state constitutions, see G.
ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 11–13 (1998); McAffee, supra note 42; Suzanna
Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 171 (1992).
56. LARRY M. ELISON & FRITZ SNYDER, THE MONTANA STATE CONSTITUTION 1–27 (G. Alan Tarr
ed., The Oxford Cmts. on the State Constitutions of the U.S., 2011).
57. McAffee, supra note 42, at 747–748.
8
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ference.58 Helmholz then studies a number of court cases in America before
concluding that Barnett was, more or less, correct.59
III. BACKGROUND CONCEPTS REGARDING THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION
By some accounts, the inalienable rights provision in Article II, section
3 of the Montana Constitution is not a substantive provision but rather is a
“primarily hortatory” statement or a statement of political philosophy.60 If
so, it is best read along with the two provisions preceding it, both of which
are broad statements that have little “practical value.”61 The two preceding
provisions are as follows:
Section 1. Popular sovereignty
All political power is vested in and derived from the people. All government
of right originates with the people, is founded upon their will only, and is
instituted solely for the good of the whole.62
Section 2. Self-government
The people have the exclusive right of governing themselves as a free, sover-
eign, and independent state. They may alter or abolish the constitution and
form of government whenever they deem it necessary.63
Compared to some of the inalienable rights provisions in older docu-
ments, Montana’s 1972 Constitution includes a fairly long inalienable rights
provision:
Section 3. Inalienable rights
All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include the
right to a clean and healthful environment and the rights of pursuing life’s
basic necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, acquiring,
possessing and protecting property, and seeking their safety, health and happi-
ness in all lawful ways. In enjoying these rights, all persons recognize corre-
sponding responsibilities.64
Article II, section 3 (hereinafter the Inalienable Rights Clause) consists of
three sentences. The first sentence is a general statement recognizing (as
opposed to granting) that people possess inalienable rights. This statement
58. R.H. HELMHOLZ, NATURAL LAW IN COURT: A HISTORY OF LEGAL THEORY IN PRACTICE viii, x
(2015).
59. Id. at 170–172 (“What can be said with some confidence, however, is that the American usage
comes close to matching in substance and frequency the evidence drawn from the European and English
case law. If the law of nature can be said to have helped shape the law there, it helped shape the law of
the United States.”).
60. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 56, at 38; see also RICK APPLEGATE, BILL OF RIGHTS 80–83
(Mont. Constitutional Convention Comm’n, Constitutional Convention Study No. 10, 1972).
61. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 56, at 36–37.
62. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 1.
63. Id. art. II, § 2.
64. Id. art. II, § 3.
9
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and the verb “include” in the second sentence allow for the recognition of
unenumerated rights.65
The second sentence consists of a list of five clauses, each of which
provides one or more inalienable rights. Because the primary verb in the
sentence is “include,” the implication is that the list that follows is not com-
prehensive but merely several specific examples of inalienable rights.66 In
theory, this is true. In practice, however, the Court has been slow to recog-
nize unenumerated inalienable rights.67 Of the five clauses in the second
sentence of the Inalienable Rights Clause, the first two are simple clauses:
the right to a clean and healthful environment, and the right of pursuing
life’s basic necessities. The next three clauses are each compound clauses:
(i) enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; (ii) acquiring, possess-
ing and protecting property; and (iii) seeking their safety, health and happi-
ness. The second sentence concludes with the limiting phrase “in all lawful
ways,” which appears to mean that all of the rights listed in the sentence are
only recognized to the extent that the person asserting the right is acting
within the scope of the law.68 Note how this second sentence includes a
number of “temporizing” terms that limit the scope of the right: for in-
stance, there is not a broad right to life’s basic necessities but rather a nar-
row right to pursue life’s basic necessities.69
The third sentence, the “Corresponding Responsibilities Clause,” as-
serts that by “enjoying” the inalienable rights listed in the second sentence
(and the unenumerated ones implied in the first), all persons “recognize
corresponding responsibilities,” whatever those may be. This article will
discuss each clause in a separate section below. First, a few general obser-
vations must be made.
A. “Inalienable” is not the same as “fundamental”
The Montana Supreme Court has long held fundamental rights include
all of the rights described in the “Declaration of Rights” in the Montana
65. See also id. art. II, § 34 (“The enumeration in this constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny, impair, or disparage others retained by the people.”).
66. As stated in Section II of this article, the Virginia Declaration of Rights asserted a closed list of
inalienable rights, while the Declaration of Independence asserted an open list.
67. See infra Section IV.
68. Yet consider the cases of Mr. Rathbone and Mr. Wadsworth: Mr. Rathbone’s act of poaching
was not lawful, nor was Mr. Wadsworth’s nine years of illegal moonlighting. Neither acted “in a lawful
way,” and yet the Court recognized their inalienable rights and struck down the laws that they violated.
69. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 56, at 38. All of the rights except the right to a clean and
healthful environment include temporizing terms.
10
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Constitution.70 The Declaration of Rights is all of Article II to the Montana
Constitution.71
“Inalienable rights,” on the other hand, are a smaller category of rights.
The word “inalienable” means “incapable of being alienated, surrendered,
or transferred.”72 The study prepared for use by the delegates during the
1972 Constitutional Convention had this to say: “Inalienable rights are . . .
held to be prior to government and not subject to any governmental
power.”73 All inalienable rights are fundamental rights, but not all funda-
mental rights are inalienable. One question the sections below will attempt
to answer is whether courts in Montana have treated a right differently be-
cause it was included in the inalienable rights section, rather than appearing
in a different section within Article II.
B. What’s at stake: levels of scrutiny
Since the mid-1980s, Montana’s jurisprudence regarding levels of
scrutiny in constitutional claims has departed from the levels-of-scrutiny
analysis under the federal constitution. The Montana Supreme Court has
developed a three-tiered approach. First, if any right is included in the Dec-
laration of Rights in the Montana Constitution, a law infringing that right
will be reviewed under strict scrutiny.74 If a right is included in any other
part of the Montana Constitution, the law infringing that right will be re-
viewed under intermediate scrutiny.75 If neither strict scrutiny nor interme-
diate scrutiny applies, courts will review the law under rational basis re-
view, the most deferential standard.76
Shannon Wadsworth’s argument hung on this balance: is the right to
pursue the opportunity to employment included within Article II, section 3
because it is a right without which other rights would have little meaning
(thus reviewed under strict scrutiny); or is it a right not expressly included
in the Montana Constitution (thus reviewed under rational basis)? So too
70. Butte Cmty. Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Mont. 1986) (“In order to be fundamental, a
right must be found within Montana’s Declaration of Rights or be a right without which other constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
71. MONT. CONST. art. II.
72. WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1254 (2d ed. 1961);
see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1518 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed. 2014) (“A right that cannot be
transferred or surrendered; esp., a natural right such as the right to own property.”).
73. APPLEGATE, supra note 60, at 80.
74. Butte Cmty. Union, 712 P.2d at 1311 (“If a fundamental right is infringed[,] . . . the government
has to show a ‘compelling state interest’ for its action.”).
75. Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 450 (Mont. 2004) (“Under middle-tier scrutiny,
the State must demonstrate the law or policy in question is reasonable and the need for the resulting
classification outweighs the value of the right to an individual.”).
76. Id. (“Under the rational basis test, the law or policy must be rationally related to a legitimate
government interest.”).
11
Bourguignon: Inalienable Rights in Montana
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2016
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\77-1\MON101.txt unknown Seq: 12  9-FEB-16 12:41
16 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 77
with the denturists: they did not even make an argument that, under rational
basis review, the Partial Denture Rule should be struck down. Thus, the
only way the denturists could prevail was if the Court applied strict scru-
tiny.77
C. Inalienable rights and the Court’s avoidance of constitutional issues
In general, the inalienable rights provision has been treated by the
Court as somewhat of a Hail Mary pass—the generalized protections of-
fered by this provision are not enforced where other, more specific, reme-
dies exist. If the Court is able to grant relief to the plaintiffs without enforc-
ing the inalienable rights provision, it tends to do so.78 The avoidance doc-
trine creates an odd result: inalienable rights, given such prominence by
philosophers and the framers of state constitutions, are given lower priority
by the Court than other, more specific rights.79
IV. ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION
A. “All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights.
They include . . .”
This phrase, which begins the Inalienable Rights Clause, is similar to
its counterpart in the 1889 Montana Constitution. The inalienable rights
provision in the 1889 Montana Constitution begins as follows:
All persons are born equally free, and have certain natural, essential and ina-
lienable rights, among which may be reckoned . . . .80
Note that the 1972 text omits the words “equally,” “natural,” and “es-
sential.” The text of this phrase in the 1889 Montana Constitution is identi-
cal to the text of the draft 1884 Montana Constitution.81 The text of the
draft 1884 Montana Constitution is itself identical to the text of the 1876
Colorado Constitution,82 except that the draft 1884 Montana Constitution
added the phrase “are born equally free.” This phrase also resembled the
phrase used by George Mason in the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights:
77. Wiser, 129 P.3d at 138.
78. E.g., Shammel v. Canyon Res. Corp., 167 P.3d 886, 888 (Mont. 2007) (the Court declined to
determine whether the “clean and healthful environment” provision creates a cause of action for mone-
tary damages between private parties because other adequate remedies existed (citing Sunburst Sch.
Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 165 P.3d 1079 (Mont. 2007))).
79. Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow Cnty., 298 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted 537
U.S. 1231 (2003), aff’d 540 U.S. 551 (2004).
80. MONT. CONST. OF 1889, art. III, § 3.
81. DRAFT MONT. CONST. OF 1884, art. I, § 3.
82. The Colorado Constitution of 1876 begins with the following: “That all persons have certain
natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned . . .” COL. CONST., art. II, § 3.
12
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“That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent rights . . . .”83
During the 1972 Constitutional Convention, Delegate Kelleher at-
tempted to replace the word “born” with the word “conceived” to clarify
that a fetus within its mother’s womb also possesses inalienable rights. Kel-
leher argued, “what’s the use of having rights of the living if I don’t have
the right to be born?”84 Delegate Kelleher’s proposed amendment was
voted down by a vote of 71–15.85
This first sentence of the Inalienable Rights Clause functions as a rec-
ognition that people have “certain” inalienable rights and that those rights
“include” the list that follows. In other words, this sentence announces that
the list in the second sentence of the Inalienable Rights Clause is an open
list. This creates the impression that the provision might be used to protect
any number of unenumerated rights and thus has some similarity to the
Unenumerated Rights Provision, Article II, section 34.86 However, courts
have not relied on this introductory phrase in their analysis of inalienable
rights, even when the court has recognized the existence of an unenumer-
ated inalienable right, such as the right of parents to care for their chil-
dren.87 Rodney Skurdal’s argument the constitution protects a right to travel
was grounded ultimately in this broad first sentence of the Inalienable
Rights Clause; however, the Court held that Skurdal’s right to travel was
not infringed by the State’s licensing requirement.88
Courts in Montana have been skeptical of litigants who make an argu-
ment based on inalienable rights without referring to an expressly enumer-
ated right. When an individual raises her inalienable rights in a court pro-
ceeding without pointing to one of the enumerated rights, the courts often
answer with something like this: “Counsel for plaintiff call our attention to
section 3 of article III of the [1889] Constitution . . . . We fail to see how
this declaration affects the matter in any way.”89 The Montana Supreme
83. COGAN, supra note 50, at 30.
84. 5 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 1640 (1981) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT V].
85. Id. at 1641–1642.
86. See ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 56, at 39 (“Rights not specifically mentioned elsewhere in
the Declaration of Rights might be derived from this section, such as the right to travel.”).
87. Matter of J.L.S., 761 P.2d 83, 840 (Mont. 1988) (citing In re R.B. Jr., 703 P.2d 846, 848 (Mont.
1985)) (“The right of the natural parents to care and custody of their children, however, is a fundamental
liberty interest.”); In re R.B., Jr, 703 P.2d 846, 848 (Mont.1985) (“the termination in Montana of a
natural parent’s right to care and custody of a child is a fundamental liberty interest, which must be
protected by fundamentally fair procedures”). In these two cases, the Court does not cite to Article II,
Section 3 of the Montana Constitution, although both cases appear to rely upon the protections recog-
nized therein.
88. Skurdal II, 767 P.2d at 306–307.
89. Conley v. Conley, 15 P.2d 922, 926 (Mont. 1932).
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Court has yet to recognize an individual’s inalienable rights if the litigant
does not make an argument under one of the enumerated rights.
B. “the right to a clean and healthful environment”
The right to a clean and healthful environment was a new addition to
the 1972 Constitution.90 Along with its companion provision, Article IX of
the 1972 Constitution, “Environment and Natural Resources,” it was much
discussed during the 1972 Convention.91 Several delegates proposed draft
environmental provisions to be included in the Bill of Rights.92 As shown
below, the delegates chose to add “clean and healthful environment” into
article II, section 3 because, as discussed below, some of the delegates
wished to clarify that the right is an inalienable right. The delegates likely
believed that the right to a clean and healthful environment would be better
protected if it was included as an inalienable right. It remains to be seen
whether they were correct.
The final text that appears in Article II, section 3 was introduced by
Delegate Burkhardt during floor debate on March 7, 1972.93 Burkhardt
stated,
This is a statement that we, as a body, have already adopted in another section
of our Constitution, in our Natural Resources section. . . . And it seems to me
that it’s simply striking the other side of the balance to put it here in our Bill
of Rights, to recognize that this is, for the time in which we’re living and for
the foreseeable future, one of the inalienable rights that we hope to assure for
our posterity. I don’t care to belabor the issue. It seems to me it’s self-evi-
dent.94
Delegate Dahood asked Burkhardt whether this amendment would al-
low a citizen to sue under article II, section 3 “when his own health and his
own property is not affected.”95 Burkhardt replied,
I read the Preamble to this section on the Bill of Rights and believed it. I think
it’s a beautiful statement, and it seems to me that what I am proposing here is
in concert with what’s proposed in that Preamble; that what we are talking
about here is the goal toward which we try to grow as a society. I do not see it
as an overt attempt to slip in with the opportunity to sue.96
90. PROPOSED 1972 CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF MONTANA: OFFICIAL TEXT WITH EXPLANA-
TION 3 (1972) [hereinafter PROPOSED 1972 CONSTITUTION] .
91. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 56, at 13, 21.
92. E.g., 1 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 96, 108
(1979) (Delegate Proposal No. 12 by Delegate Cate & Delegate Proposal No. 21 by Delegate McNeil)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT I].
93. Id. at 1637.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT V, supra note 84, at 1638 (in other words, if other
Article II, Section 3 rights are not infringed).
96. Id.
14
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Delegate Eck then clarified somewhat that the Bill of Rights Commit-
tee and the Natural Resources Committee coordinated with each other such
that the “statement of each individual’s rights” would appear in the Bill of
Rights and other provisions would appear in article IX.97 Delegate McNeil
of the Natural Resources Committee opined that “clean and healthful”
“isn’t as strong as what we really want, but if that’s the will of the Conven-
tion and as strong as they think they can pass, why, I would agree with it.”98
After this discussion, the delegates voted by a margin of 79–7 in favor of
adding “the right to a clean and healthful environment” to the draft article
II, section 3.99
During the ratification debate, the Proposed 1972 Constitution pam-
phlet noted the right to a clean and healthful environment as among the new
provisions added to the Bill of Rights of the 1889 Constitution.100 The pam-
phlet noted that article II, section 3 “[r]evises [the] 1889 Constitution by
adding three rights,” one of which was “relating to [the] environment.”101
The right to a clean and healthful environment has been the subject of
numerous law review articles,102 and this article will not cover the same
ground at length. Further, the specific question of whether the right to a
clean and healthful environment is a “self-executing” right has been fre-
quently discussed and will not be analyzed further here.103 However, com-
pared to other inalienable rights, it has been enforced a number of times. In
thirteen of the leading Montana Supreme Court cases involving the right to
a clean and healthful environment, the Court has enforced the substantive
right six times104 and declined to enforce it seven times.105
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1640.
100. PROPOSED 1972 CONSTITUTION, supra note 90, at 3.
101. Id. at 6.
102. E.g., John Bloomquist, The Agricultural Perspective: TMDLs in the Context of a Clean and
Healthful Environment, 22 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 19 (2001); Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History and Future of Montana’s Environmental Provisions,
64 MONT. L. REV. 157 (2003); Jack Tuholske, The Legislature Shall Make No Law . . . Abridging
Montanans’ Constitutional Rights to a Clean and Healthful Environment, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL.
L.J. 311 (2007); Bryan P. Wilson, State Constitutional Environmental Rights and Judicial Activism: Is
The Big Sky Falling?, 53 EMORY L.J. 627 (2004); and Chase Naber, student author, Murky Waters:
Private Action and the Right to a Clean and Healthful Environment: An Examination of Cape-France
Enterprises v. Estate of Peed, 64 MONT. L. REV. 357 (2003).
103. E.g., Rob Natelson, Montana Constitution Project Unveiled at UM: Documents “May Change
Way We Think” About Intent, MONT. LAW., at 14 (May 2008); ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 56, at 39;
John L. Horwich, MEIC v. DEQ: An Inadequate Effort to Address the Meaning of Montana’s Constitu-
tional Environmental Provisions, 62 MONT. L. REV. 269 (2001).
104. State v. Bernhard, 568 P.2d 136, 138 (Mont. 1977); State ex rel. Dep’t of Health and Envtl.
Scis. v. Green, 739 P.2d 469, 473 (Mont. 1987); Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988
P.2d 1236, 1246 (Mont. 1999) [hereinafter MEIC]; Cape-France Enters. v. Estate of Peed, 29 P.3d 1011,
15
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The right to a clean and healthful environment has been treated as an
aspect of the State’s police power when balanced against the article II, sec-
tion 3 right to acquire and possess property.106 It has also been employed to
rescind a contract between private parties—where there was no state ac-
tion—as impossible because it required the drilling of a well that might
cause environmental damage.107
In Montana Environmental Information Center v. Department of Envi-
ronmental Equiality,108 the Court read the provision together with the envi-
ronmental provisions of article IX and held the right to a clean and healthful
environment to be a fundamental right for which strict scrutiny applies.109
The Court stated that the clean and healthful environment provision may
even be used to prevent likely harm that has not yet occurred: “Our consti-
tution does not require that dead fish float on the surface of our state’s
rivers and streams before its farsighted environmental protections can be
invoked.”110
In some cases, the Court has treated the article II right to a clean and
healthful environment as merely a remedy of last resort, choosing to avoid
enforcing the right in cases where other adequate remedies exist.111 The
Court has also disposed of some cases by holding that plaintiffs lack stand-
ing to sue under the right to a clean and healthful environment.112
It is impossible to say whether the right to a clean and healthful envi-
ronment has been enforced more or less than it otherwise would have been
due to its inclusion in article II, section 3. Future cases may indicate
1016–1017 (Mont. 2001); Seven-Up Pete Venture v. State, 114 P.3d 1009, 1023 (Mont. 2005); and
Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2, 165 P.3d at 1093.
105. Kadillak v. Anaconda, 602 P.2d 147, 153–154 (Mont. 1979); Merlin Myers Revocable Trust v.
Yellowstone Cnty., 53 P.3d 1268, 1271–1272 (Mont. 2002); Shammel v. Canyon Res. Corp., 82 P.3d
912, 919 (Mont. 2003); Lohmeier v. Gallatin Cnty., 135 P.3d 775, 777–778 (Mont. 2006); Tally Bissell
Neighbors, Inc. v. Eyrie Shotgun Ranch, LLC, 228 P.3d 1134, 1142 (Mont. 2010); Williamson v. Mont.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 272 P.3d 71, 85–86 (Mont. 2012); and N. Plains Res. Council v. Mont. Bd. of Land
Comm’rs, 288 P.3d 169, 174 (Mont. 2012).
106. Bernhard, 568 P.2d at 138; Green, 739 P.2d at 305 (no inalienable right exists to acquire junk
cars without a license because, through the right to a clean and healthful environment, the police power
extends to preserving aesthetic values).
107. Cape-France Enters., 29 P.3d at 1016–1017.
108. 988 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 1999).
109. Id. at 1249. It is entirely possible that the Court’s sweeping holding in MEIC—requiring strict
scrutiny for even minor infringements of the right to a clean and healthful environment—had the unan-
ticipated effect of making courts less likely to find that the right was infringed. See e.g., N. Plains Res.
Council, 288 P.3d at 174–175.
110. Id.
111. E.g., Tally Bissell Neighbors, Inc., 228 P.3d at 1142–1143.
112. Lohmeier, 135 P.3d at 777–778 (Plaintiffs have no standing to sue under clean and healthful
environment to have their properties added into a new sewer district); Williamson, 272 P.3d at 85–86
(Plaintiffs have no standing under clean and healthful environment to sue agency to force it to use
efficient light bulbs to reduce fossil fuel emissions).
16
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whether environmental plaintiffs are better off for having an inalienable
right to a clean and healthful environment (and thus receiving strict scrutiny
once in a while) as opposed to having only an article IX right to a clean and
healthful environment (thus receiving intermediate scrutiny in a larger num-
ber of cases).
C. “the rights of pursuing life’s basic necessities”
1. History of the provision
On January 27, 1972, Delegate Proposal No. 45, signed by seven dele-
gates, proposed the following addition to the inalienable rights section: “the
right to the basic necessities of life including the right to adequate nourish-
ment, housing, and medical care . . . .”113 The notion of including a right to
welfare benefits in the Constitution—as an inalienable right, no less—was
controversial, as the following passages will show. On February 23, 1972,
the Bill of Rights Committee Proposal stated that it had added “the right to
pursue life’s basic necessities” to the draft article II, section 3 “as a state-
ment of principle.”114 In the Proposal, the Bill of Rights Committee at-
tempted to explain the purpose behind this addition:
The intent of the committee on this point is not to create a substantive right
for all for the necessities of life to be provided by the public treasury.
The committee heard considerable testimony, from low income and so-
cial services people alike, that the state’s current public assistance programs
are not meeting the genuine needs of low income people who, because of
circumstances beyond their control, are unable to obtain basic necessities. Ac-
cordingly, it is hoped that the legislature will have occasion to review these
programs and upgrade them where necessary to provide full necessities to
those in genuine need and to curb whatever abuses may exist in the programs.
What was attempted in this part of the proposed section was a statement
of the principle that all persons have the inalienable right to pursue the basic
necessities of life—that there can be no right to life apart from the possibility
of existence.115
Thus, the Bill of Rights Committee appears to have anticipated that the
basic necessities provision would not result in a massive welfare state. In-
stead, it would encourage the Legislature to improve programs for public
assistance to provide for individuals who have “genuine needs” due to “cir-
cumstances beyond their control.”116 The Committee’s final statement,
“there can be no right to life apart from the possibility of existence,” ap-
113. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT I, supra note 92, at 142.
114. 2 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 627 (1979)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT II].
115. Id.
116. Id.
17
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pears to go further in characterizing this right as one which only applies in
dire situations, where life itself  is at stake.
The delegates viewed this right as a limited one. For instance, when
the delegates debated whether a controversial welfare provision should be
included in the Constitution in the Institutions and Assistance section (arti-
cle XII, section 2), Delegate McNeil proposed an amendment adding “the
opportunity to earn.”117 Delegate Monroe opposed the amendment, stating
“It seems to me we’ve kind of covered it in our section 3 of the Bill of
Rights. We’ve suggested there that people have a right to pursue some of
the basic necessities . . . .”118 Thus, the Constitutional Convention delegates
largely believed that the right to pursue life’s basic necessities should be
viewed as a limited right, applying to people in genuine need; and further,
that it is the responsibility of the Legislature (not the courts) to provide for
those individuals.
In debates on other provisions, two Delegates referred back to the right
to life’s basic necessities in more innovative fashion to justify their argu-
ments about other provisions. Delegate Davis argued that an amendment
prohibiting businesses from being open on Sunday would infringe the right
of pursing life’s basic necessities for some people, for instance Seventh Day
Adventists.119 Later, Delegate Aronow argued in favor of his own amend-
ment, which added back in a provision creating the office of the Clerk of
the Supreme Court: “This morning we adopted . . . the rights of pursuing
life’s basic necessities. We’re not here to play God, to take away a man’s
livelihood, take away his office; he had a right to rely upon it.”120
The Proposed 1972 Constitution pamphlet noted the right to life’s ba-
sic necessities as among the new provisions added to the Bill of Rights of
the 1889 Constitution.121 The pamphlet stated that article II, section 3
“[r]evises [the] 1889 Constitution by adding three rights,” one of which was
“relating to . . . basic necessities.”122
The right to pursue life’s basic necessities, along with some other pro-
visions in article II, section 3, is limited by a “temporizing” verb: to pursue
life’s basic necessities.123 According to Elison and Snyder, the use of a
117. 4 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 2294 (1979).
118. Id.
119. 6 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 2370 (1979) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT VI].
120. 7 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 2690 (1979). Here, Dele-
gate Aronow appears to be arguing that the Clerk of the Supreme Court has a property right in a particu-
lar job; as we shall see below, in the discussion on Wadsworth, people have no property right in a
particular job.
121. PROPOSED 1972 CONSTITUTION, supra note 90, at 3.
122. Id. at 6.
123. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 56, at 37–38.
18
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temporizing verb is an indication that the right is not “possessed or guaran-
teed” to the same extent as the “right to a clean and healthful environment,”
which is not limited by a temporizing verb.124 Perhaps the delegates’ use of
the temporizing verb “pursue” was intended to treat it as a statement of
principal and not a substantive right.
2. Case law on the right to pursue life’s basic necessities
The lead case determining whether the right to life’s basic necessities
includes a right to receive welfare benefits is Butte Community Union v.
Lewis.125 The Court struck down a law that restricted welfare benefits, but
not because of any provisions in the Montana Constitution’s Declaration of
Rights—instead, the Court relied on the economic assistance clause, article
XII, section 3, clause 3.126 The Court stated that the right to welfare is not
fundamental because it is not “found within Montana’s Declaration of
Rights” and it is not “a right ‘without which other constitutionally guaran-
teed rights would have little meaning.’”127
Outside of the context of welfare, individuals have made arguments
under the right to pursue life’s basic necessities after they lost their job or
were denied worker’s compensation benefits. The Court has consistently
denied these requests. The Court has held there is no inalienable right to
earn a living practicing law; rather, the practice of law is “a privilege bur-
dened with conditions.”128 In a wrongful termination case in which the
Court reversed a grant of summary judgment for the employer, Justice Mor-
rison stated in a special concurrence that “the right to terminate is not abso-
lute but subject to exercise in accordance with constitutional principles.”129
The Court has chosen to avoid application of the inalienable right to pursue
life’s necessities where other grounds exist for disposing of the case.130
124. Id.
125. 712 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Mont. 1986) (Lewis has been cited by the Court in many subsequent
cases, e.g., Zempel v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund, 938 P.2d 658, 661 (Mont. 1997); In re T.W., 126
P.3d 491, 495 (Mont. 2005); and Matter of Wood, 768 P.2d 1370, 1376 (Mont. 1989)).
126. Id. at 1313–1314.
127. Id. at 1311 (quoting Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d 931, 940 (Mont. 1984)).
128. Petition of Morris, 575 P.2d 37, 38 (Mont. 1978).
129. Dare v. Mont. Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d 1015, 1021 (Mont. 1984) (Morrison, J., specially
concurring).
130. E.g., Haux v. Mont. Rail Link, Inc., 97 P.3d 540, 545 (Mont. 2004) (avoiding the constitutional
question because the statute under which Plaintiff sued “does create a cause of action for mismanage-
ment”); Henry v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 982 P.2d 456, 462 (Mont. 1999) (Plaintiff “provides no legal
analysis” as to why “the failure of the ODA to provide rehabilitation benefits affects his fundamental
right to pursue life’s basic necessities”).
19
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3. Case law on the unenumerated right to the opportunity to pursue
employment
In Wadsworth v. State,131 the Court used the right to pursue life’s basic
necessities as the textual basis for the creation of a new, unenumerated
right: the right to the opportunity to pursue employment.132 Justice Nelson,
writing the majority opinion in Wadsworth, held the right to “the opportu-
nity to pursue employment” was “necessary to enjoy the right to pursue
life’s basic necessities,” and therefore was a fundamental right subject to
strict scrutiny review. Justice Nelson reasoned:
[E]mployment serves not only to provide income for the most basic of life’s
necessities, such as food, clothing, and shelter for the worker and the worker’s
family, but for many, if not most, employment also provides their only means
to secure other essentials of modern life, including health and medical insur-
ance, retirement, and day care.133
The case of Shannon Wadsworth was far from the cases of individuals
with “genuine needs” because of “circumstances beyond their control.”134
Wadsworth worked as a real estate appraiser for the Department of Reve-
nue, and he was terminated when he violated the agency’s conflict of inter-
est rule by doing private appraisal work on the side.135 In fact, Wadsworth
appears not to have put on any evidence showing that a restriction on moon-
lighting actually affected the “basic necessities” of his life.136
In Wadsworth, Justice Nelson clarified that the Court’s holding did not
create a property interest in a particular job: “we distinguish the right to a
particular job or employment from the right to pursue life’s basic necessi-
ties through employment.”137 Even so, the Court’s decision in Wadsworth
created the impression that the Court might enforce the unenumerated right
131. 911 P.2d 1165 (Mont. 1996).
132. Id. at 1172. The majority opinion used Butte Cmty. Union to conclude that the right to the
opportunity to pursue employment was a right “‘without which [the right to pursue life’s basic necessi-
ties] would have little meaning.’” Butte Cmty. Union, 712 P.2d at 1311 (quoting Matter of C.H., 683
P.2d at 940). Justice Nelson also cites a U.S. Supreme Court case that concludes, similar to Butte Cmty.
Union, “First Amendment encompasses those rights that, while not specifically enumerated in the very
terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to enjoyment of other First Amendment rights.”
Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1172 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Court for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S.
596, 604 (1982)).
133. Id.
134. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT II, supra note 114, at 627.
135. Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1167–1168.
136. Id. at 1179 (Erdmann, J., specially concurring) (“The majority, however, fails to construe the
meaning of ‘life’s basic necessities.’ In fact, there was no discussion in the majority opinion as to
whether Wadsworth’s second job was needed in order for him to obtain these basic necessities. Life’s
basic necessities cannot and should not be an infinite term. One person’s necessity can be another
person’s luxury. The right to the opportunity to pursue employment is fundamental to the extent that
employment provides those necessities.”).
137. Id. at 1172 (majority).
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to the opportunity to pursue employment as a fundamental right in other
cases.
To date, that has not occurred. In all of the four lead cases since Wad-
sworth in which a plaintiff has argued that the right to the opportunity to
pursue employment was infringed, courts have declined to enforce the right.
First, terminating an employee for misconduct did not infringe his right to
the opportunity to pursue employment.138 Second, the right to the opportu-
nity to pursue employment did not void a law that prohibited game farm
operators from allowing patrons to kill animals for a fee because the police
power authorized the law.139 Third, in Wiser, the right to the opportunity to
pursue employment was not infringed by a regulation that required individ-
uals who intended to have a partial denture procedure performed by a den-
turist to consult with a dentist before a denturist performed the proce-
dure.140 As in Kafka,141 the regulation was within the police power.142 Fi-
nally, the right to the opportunity to pursue employment was not infringed
by a state law that prohibited medical marijuana providers from charging a
fee for their services or for assisting more than three clients—once again,
the Court held the police power authorized the law.143
It is difficult to distinguish the facts of Wadsworth from the facts in
Kafka, Wiser, or Montana Cannabis.144 Similar to Wadsworth, the plaintiffs
in Kafka and Montana Cannabis lost their livelihood by statutes that pro-
138. Hafner v. Mont. Dept. of Labor and Indus., 929 P.2d 233, 237–238 (Mont. 1996) (“In contrast
to Wadsworth, Hafner was not terminated for pursuing life’s basic necessities”; rather, he was termi-
nated because he knowingly continued working on a project without disclosing a serious conflict of
interest. It was the “serious” nature of that conflict that apparently distinguished Hafner from Wad-
sworth).
139. Kafka v. Hagener, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1043 (D. Mont. 2001) (“No fundamental right is
implicated by banning fee killing of game farm animals in Montana. . . . To accept Plaintiffs’ argument
would be the equivalent of neutering the regulatory power of state government.”).
140. Wiser, 129 P.3d at 139.
141. Kafka, 176 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.
142. Wiser, 129 P.3d at 139 (“[W]hile one does have the fundamental right to the opportunity to
pursue employment, one does not have the fundamental right to practice his or her profession free of
state regulation promulgated to protect the public’s welfare.”).
143. Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State, 286 P.3d 1161, 1166 (Mont. 2012) (“[T]he legislature, in
its exercise of the State’s police powers, decided that it would legalize the limited use of medicinal
marijuana while maintaining a prohibition on the sale of medical marijuana. This action prohibits em-
ployment as a medical marijuana provider[,] . . . Providers, who are ultimately horticulturists, remain
free to pursue horticulture work generally, and further, are not proscribed from practicing the art of
horticulture—including hydroponic horticulture—for profit.”) (emphasis added). This author has previ-
ously argued that the Court was incorrect in Montana Cannabis to distinguish Wadsworth and that, if
Wadsworth means what it seems to literally say, the Court should rather have applied strict scrutiny to
the 2011 medical marijuana law’s infringement of the right to the opportunity to pursue employment.
Thomas J. Bourguignon, Note, Montana Cannabis Industry Association v. State of Montana and the
Constitutionality of Medical Marijuana, 75 MONT. L. REV. 167, 186–187 (2014).
144. Id.
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hibited their respective business models.145 The plaintiffs in Wiser lost a
portion of their livelihood by a regulation that would allow dentists to talk
some people out of partial denture procedures.146 If Wadsworth had been
the last of these cases chronologically, one would likely have predicted that
the Court would not enforce a substantive right to the opportunity to pursue
employment.
One distinguishing feature emerges, however: in Wadsworth, the Court
did not indicate that the police power authorized the statute restricting Wad-
sworth’s ability to hold a second job. In fact, during the Court’s application
of strict scrutiny review, it stated that the purpose of the regulation prohibit-
ing moonlighting was “avoiding the appearance of impropriety of real es-
tate appraisers,” despite the lack of any actual complaints of the appearance
of impropriety.147 In other words, the State had no valid police power justi-
fication for the anti-moonlighting rule.
Thus, based on the reasoning and the holdings in the cases decided to
date, the analytical framework that the Court should use in the future to
analyze the right to pursue employment is as follows:
1. Does the plaintiff have access to other adequate remedies such that the
court can (or must) avoid reaching the constitutional issue?148
2. Is the statute or regulation authorized by the state’s police power or other
authorization?149
3. Does the plaintiff’s claim rely on an assertion that plaintiff has a property
interest in a particular job?150
4. Was the plaintiff actually harmed in her ability to pursue life’s basic neces-
sities?151
D. “enjoying and defending their lives and liberties”
This phrase appeared verbatim in the 1889 Montana Constitution, the
draft 1884 Montana Constitution, the 1876 Colorado Constitution, and in an
almost verbatim formulation in the 1874 Pennsylvania Constitution.152 An
even more ancient version of the phrase appears in the Virginia Declaration
145. Id. at 1163–1164; Kafka, 176 F. Supp. 2d at 1040–1041.
146. Wiser, 129 P.3d at 136 (the Partial Denture Rule requires “that denturists refer all partial den-
ture patients to dentists before providing partial denture services”).
147. Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1174–1175.
148. E.g., Haux, 97 P.3d at 545.
149. E.g., Wiser, 129 P.3d at 138.
150. E.g., Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1172–1173.
151. Id. at 1179 (Erdmann, J., specially concurring). As stated above, the Court in Wadsworth did
not make anything of the fact that Wadsworth put on no evidence as to how he was unable to pursue
life’s basic necessities as a result of the regulation.
152. MONT. CONST. OF 1889, art. III, § 3; MONT. CONST. OF 1884, art. I, § 3; COL. CONST. OF 1876
art. II, § 3; PENN. CONST. OF 1874, art. I, § 1.
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of Rights of 1776: “the enjoyment of life and liberty.”153 Despite its long
history, Montana courts have not relied on it as often as the next phrase in
the Inalienable Rights Clause: “acquiring, possessing, and protecting prop-
erty.”
The leading case decided under this provision is Matter of C.H.154 In
C.H., a youth court ordered that C.H., a minor, be sent to an institution for
45 days to undertake a “predispositional evaluation,” and placed her on pro-
bation for one year.155 C.H. challenged the statute enabling the youth court
on a number of theories, including a personal liberty theory derived from
the “lives and liberties” clause from article II, section 3.156 The Court ana-
lyzed whether “physical liberty” is an unenumerated fundamental right. The
Court decided to read several constitutional provisions together and con-
cluded physical liberty is a fundamental right because it is a right “without
which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little mean-
ing.”157 The Court then held the “deprivation of the physical liberty of C.H.
for a period of 45 days” infringed her right to physical liberty.158 The Court
thus stated that it would apply strict scrutiny.159 However, the Court held,
without any express analysis of whether a compelling state interest existed,
that the 45-day deprivation of liberty “was not an unreasonable period of
time.”160
In a subsequent case, the Court chose not to extend its holding in C.H.
In Jordan v. Kalin,161 the plaintiff sought an order of protection against a
former coworker. The defendant Kalin argued that, under the Inalienable
Rights Clause, the district court could not punish him “for exercising his
right to defend his liberty,” or in other words, that his attempt to defend
himself against the order of protection was used by the district court as
evidence of his interest in the plaintiff.162 The Court disagreed with Kalin,
observing that the defendant’s in-court behavior was “indicative, not of Ka-
lin’s interest in defending himself, but of his intense interest in pursuing
153. COGAN, supra note 50, at 30.
154. 683 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1984). C.H. has been cited by the Court many times regarding the right to
physical liberty, e.g., In re T.W., 126 P.3d at 499 (Leaphart, J., dissenting); and Kloss v. Edward D.
Jones & Co., Inc., 54 P.3d 1, 13 (Mont. 2002).
155. Id. at 933.
156. Id. at 940.
157. Id. The Court considered the cumulative effect of a portion of the Preamble to the Montana
Constitution (“We the people of Montana . . . desiring . . . to secure the blessings of liberty . . . do ordain
and establish this constitution”); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“enjoying and defending their lives and
liberties”); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4 (dignity and equal protection); and MONT. CONST. art. II, § 17
(“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d at 941.
161. 256 P.3d 909 (Mont. 2011).
162. Id. at 910, 913.
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Jordan” and concluded that, although Kalin had a constitutional right to
defend himself, the district court was not punishing him for exercising that
right.163
The Court has used other constitutional provisions to enforce the right
to physical liberty. In Armstrong v. State,164  the Court struck down a stat-
ute prohibiting physician’s assistants from performing abortions.165 Arm-
strong did not rely upon C.H. or upon the Inalienable Rights Clause for its
holding; however, its holding under the right to privacy—article II, section
10 of the Montana Constitution—includes a significant physical liberty or
autonomy component:
We hold that the personal autonomy component of this right [to privacy]
broadly guarantees each individual the right to make medical judgments af-
fecting her or his bodily integrity and health in partnership with a chosen
health care provider free from the interference of the government, except in
very limited circumstances not at issue here. More narrowly, we hold that
Article II, Section 10, protects a woman’s right of procreative autonomy—
here, the right to seek and to obtain a specific lawful medical procedure, a
pre-viability abortion, from a health care provider of her choice.166
Arguably, if there was no express right to privacy in the Montana Con-
stitution, then the plaintiffs in Armstrong might have prevailed under article
II, section 3—as the Court observed in dicta.167 In either case, the Court in
Armstrong chose to recognize a new, unenumerated right based on other
rights expressed in article II.
E. “acquiring, possessing and protecting property”
This phrase appeared verbatim in the 1889 Montana Constitution, the
draft 1884 Montana Constitution, the 1876 Colorado Constitution, and the
1874 Pennsylvania Constitution.168 It also appeared in similar formulation
in the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776: “with the means of acquiring
and possessing property.”169
This provision has a long history and has been interpreted and en-
forced in many cases. Elison and Snyder observe that the 1889 Montana
Constitution’s inalienable rights provision “was primarily intended to pro-
163. Id. at 913.
164. 989 P.2d 364 (Mont. 1999).
165. Id. at 384.
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 383 (“Article II, Section 3, guarantees each person the inalienable right to seek safety,
health and happiness in all lawful ways—i.e., in the context of this case, the right to seek and obtain
medical care from a chosen health care provider and to make personal judgments affecting one’s own
health and bodily integrity without government interference.”).
168. MONT. CONST. OF 1889, art. III, § 3; MONT. CONST. OF 1884, art. I, § 3; COL. CONST. OF 1876
art. II, § 3; PENN. CONST. OF 1874, art. I, § 1.
169. COGAN, supra note 50, at 30.
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tect . . . vested property rights.”170 Many cases have been brought arguing
for the application of this provision. In eight of the leading cases prior to the
1972 Montana constitution, the Court enforced the right to acquire, protect,
and possess property four times,171 and declined to enforce it four times.172
Recent cases brought under the Property Clause have tested some of
the boundaries of the doctrine. In two cases, the Property Clause has justi-
fied certain activities of security or police. The right to protect property
includes the right of a private security guard to stop and frisk potential
criminals to prevent property damage.173 Further, police officers who en-
tered a residence attempting to protect the property therein from a criminal
were authorized to do so by the Property Clause, which provided a compel-
ling state interest for the officers’ infringement of the property owner’s
right to privacy.174
In two other cases, the Court balanced property rights protected by the
Property Clause against aesthetic rights or environmental rights protected
by the Clean and Healthful Environment Clause, and the Property Clause
was defeated in both. In the earlier case, the Court upheld a law regulating
junkyards, the Motor Vehicle Wrecking Facilities Act. The Court held that
aesthetic values provide sufficient justification to infringe individual prop-
erty rights under the Property Clause.175 In the second case—a challenge to
regulations promulgated under the Motor Vehicle Recycling and Disposal
Act and Junk Yards Along Roads Act—the Court held more broadly that
owners of junkyards do not have an inalienable right to acquire junk vehi-
cles without a license.176
170. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 56, at 38.
171. Butte & B. Consol. Min. Co. v. Mont. Ore-Purchasing Co., 63 P. 825, 827 (Mont. 1901) (statute
that retroactively took away vested joint tenancy rights struck down as unconstitutional); Butte Miners’
Union v. City of Butte, 194 P. 149, 151 (Mont. 1920) (city held liable for damage caused in a riot even
though plaintiffs were a cause of the riot); Rathbone, 100 P.2d 86, 91 (defense of property held to be a
valid defense against a regulation prohibiting poaching); State v. Gleason, 277 P.2d 530, 534 (Mont.
1954) (statute requiring licensing of photographers struck down).
172. Hersey v. Nelson, 131 P. 30, 34–35 (Mont. 1913) (statute upheld which required newspapers to
sublet certain contracts); Colville v. Fox, 149 P. 496, 497, 499 (Mont. 1915) (statute upheld which
allowed state inspector to destroy infected fruit); State v. Johnson, 243 P. 1073, 1080 (Mont. 1926)
(statute upheld which regulated certain transportation companies); Young v. Bd. of Trustees of Broad-
water Cnty. High School, 4 P.2d 725, 727–728 (Mont. 1931) (school board’s statutory power to rent
gymnasium upheld because constitutional protection of property rights does not guarantee anyone a
monopoly).
173. State v. Bradford, 683 P.2d 924, 928 (Mont. 1984).
174. State ex rel. Zander v. Dist. Court of Fourth Judicial Dist., 591 P.2d 656, 660–661 (Mont.
1979).
175. Bernhard, 568 P.2d at 138.
176. State ex rel. Dep’t of Health and Envtl. Scis., 739 P.2d at 471, 473.
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F. “seeking their safety, health and happiness”
1. History of the provision
At first blush, neither safety nor health nor happiness appears to be a
right that can be inalienably possessed—in other words, we the people enter
into unsafe situations, suffer deprivations of health, and suffer through peri-
ods of unhappiness. However, the text in the Constitution only protects our
right to seek safety, health, and happiness.
This provision appeared in similar formulation (“seeking and obtaining
their safety and happiness”) in the 1889 Montana Constitution, the draft
1884 Montana Constitution, the 1876 Colorado Constitution, and in similar
form in the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776.177 The 1972 Constitu-
tion added “health” and deleted “obtaining.”
During the 1972 Constitutional Convention, no delegate proposals ad-
ded “health” or deleted “obtaining.” Instead, the Bill of Rights Committee
itself made those changes, and its February 22, 1972, Proposal included the
text as ultimately ratified.178 According to the Proposal: “An additional
right, the right of seeking health was incorporated in recognition of the fact
that a right to life without health is a sorry proposition.”179 Despite being a
new addition to the Montana Constitution in 1972, the right of seeking
health was not often referenced by the delegates.
The Proposed 1972 Constitution pamphlet noted the right to seek
health as among the new provisions added to the Bill of Rights of the 1889
Constitution.180 The pamphlet noted that article II, section 3 “[r]evises [the]
1889 Constitution by adding three rights,” one of which was “relating to . . .
health.”181
2. Case law on the right to seek safety, health, and happiness
This clause has not been analyzed frequently by the Court, partly be-
cause of the Court’s avoidance of constitutional issues. The “right to seek
. . . happiness” has occasionally been mentioned by the Court but has yet to
be enforced.182 For instance, in Simms v. Eighteenth Judicial District
177. MONT. CONST. OF 1889, art. III, § 3; MONT. CONST. OF 1884, art. I, § 3; COL. CONST. OF 1876,
art. II, § 3; Virginia Declaration of Rights, § 1. Reprinted in COGAN, supra note 50, at 30.
178. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT II, supra note 114, at 620.
179. Id. at 627.
180. PROPOSED 1972 CONSTITUTION, supra note 90, at 3.
181. Id. at 6.
182. E.g., Welsh v. Pritchard, 241 P.2d 816, 819 (Mont. 1952) (in suit by married couple against
landlord for violation of their common-law right to privacy, the Court supports its adoption of the then
current federal right to privacy with several sources, including the following quote from a Missouri case:
“The basis of the ‘right of privacy’ is the ‘right to be let alone’ and it is ‘a part of the right to liberty and
26
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Court,183 the Court struck down the use of the police power to compel an
individual to undergo at his own expense an out-of-state medical examina-
tion.184 Randall Simms sued his physician for professional negligence. The
district court compelled Simms to undergo a medical examination with an
out-of-state doctor selected by the defendants, which Simms refused to
do.185 The Court held that, due to the plaintiff’s inalienable rights to seek
safety, health, and happiness, and specifically because “traveling to Port-
land would be ‘uncomfortable’ for Simms,” the district court erred in find-
ing “good cause” existed to order the medical examination and that the
district court “should consider both the location and nature of the exam.”186
3. Case law on the alleged right to access medication or medical
procedures
After the Court’s expansive protection of physical liberty and auton-
omy in Armstrong, Montanans might have had reason to believe their rights
to access medical procedures and even medication could not be infringed by
the State without the showing of a compelling state interest. In two recent
cases, Wiser and Montana Cannabis, plaintiffs argued their respective cases
were not distinguishable from the Court’s expansive holding in Arm-
strong.187 In both cases, the Court declined to recognize the right to access
medication or medical procedures.188
In Wiser, the plaintiffs did not argue that their inalienable right to seek
health was infringed.189 Rather, plaintiffs argued their right to the opportu-
nity to pursue employment and their patients’ privacy right to obtain a par-
ticular lawful medical procedure from a health care provider were in-
fringed.190 The Court reasoned that the State’s police power authorized the
pursuit of happiness.’”) (quoting Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W. 2d 291, 294 (Mo. 1952); State ex rel.
Zander, 594 P.2d at 279 (Shea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Justice Shea quoted Olm-
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928): “The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfac-
tions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be
let alone the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”).
183. 68 P.3d 678 (Mont. 2003).
184. Id. at 683, 685 (“When a proposed examination risks unnecessary, painful or harmful proce-
dures the scale must favor protecting the individual’s rights.”).
185. Id. at 680–681.
186. Id. at 683–685.
187. Appellants’ Br. at 14–15, Wiser v. State, Dept. of Commerce (Mont. Nov. 22, 2004) (No.
04587); Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1167.
188. Wiser, 129 P.3d at 138; Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1168.
189. Wiser, 129 P.3d at 137.
190. Id. (quoting Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 380). In all likelihood, the plaintiffs in Wiser briefed the
privacy issue rather than the right to seek health because of the expansive holding in Armstrong and
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State to regulate “health care professions necessary for the public’s protec-
tion.”191
In Montana Cannabis, the plaintiffs argued the right to seek health and
the right to privacy independently and collectively created a right to access
medication regardless of the legality of the medication.192 The Court fol-
lowed Wiser and held the police power authorized the statute and no funda-
mental rights were infringed.193 The Court declined to recognize the exis-
tence of an unenumerated right to access medication, reasoning that no
other jurisdiction has recognized such a right.194
Thus, the unenumerated right to access medication or medical proce-
dures is unlikely to be recognized by the Court anytime soon—although the
Court’s reasoning based upon other jurisdictions leaves the door open in
case other jurisdictions start recognizing such a claim.
G. “in all lawful ways.”
The text of article III, section 3 of the 1889 Montana Constitution is
identical to the text of article I, section 3 of the draft 1884 Montana Consti-
tution, with one exception: the 1889 Montana Constitution added “in all
lawful ways” to the end of the provision.195 The transcript of the 1889 Con-
stitutional Convention is silent as to the delegates’ rationale for the addi-
tion.196 Elison and Snyder state,
If [the enumerated inalienable rights] were to be given their apparent meaning
as generalized limitations upon the exercise of police power, they would pre-
vent government control of a variety of ordinary, as well as more idiosyn-
cratic, human actions. However, the concluding phrase ‘in all lawful ways’
compromises all the listed rights of autonomy, meaning that government is
not constitutionally prohibited in placing unspecified limits on individual au-
tonomy . . . .”197
because of the expansive holding in an oft-cited, rarely-followed case out of Texas, Andrews v. Ballard,
498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1980), which held that “patients have a broad right to health care which
includes the fundamental right to seek treatment from acupuncturists who have not been licensed or
approved by the relevant licensing or medical board.”
191. Id. at 138.
192. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1166–1168.
193. Id. at 1167–1168.
194. Id. at 1167 (citations omitted); see also Bourguignon, supra note 143, at 187–188 (where this
author argued that although the right to seek health was arguably infringed by the State’s restrictions on
medical marijuana, there is no affirmative right of access to marijuana regardless of its legality).
195. MONT. CONST. OF 1889, art. I, § 3, art. III, § 3,
196. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION HELD IN THE CITY OF HE-
LENA, MONTANA JULY 4TH, 1889, AUGUST 17TH, 1889, at 98, 270–271 (State Publishing Co. 1921).
When the Committee of the Whole debated the draft Article III, Section 3 on July 18, 1889, “in all
lawful ways” had already been added. The section was not amended during debate, and on July 23, 1889
the entirety of Article III was approved by a vote of 66–1.
197. ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 56, at 38.
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Elison and Snyder arrive at the general conclusion that “the generalized
statement of inalienable rights has not been an effective protection for indi-
vidual rights claimed in opposition to the exercise of state police power.”198
This four-word provision clarifies that inalienable rights are subject to
the police power of the State, even more so than other article II rights,
because only in article II, section 3 does a phrase such as “in all lawful
ways” occur. But how does the Court conduct its balancing between the
inalienable rights of the people on one hand and the police power of the
State to regulate for public health, safety, and welfare on the other hand?
Does this provision instruct courts to apply rational basis review to laws
infringing inalienable rights as opposed to applying strict scrutiny, which is
normally applied to laws that infringe any portion of article II of the Mon-
tana Constitution? The short answer is that the Court has been inconsistent
over the decades in how it has chosen to balance inalienable rights against
the State’s police power. Consequently, there is no clear guidance about
how the Court will balance these conflicting needs in future cases.
In State v. Gateway Mortuaries,199 the Court struck down a law
prohibiting most pre-death burial or cremation contracts.200 The Court
asked whether the law “bear[s] a real and substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or . . . general welfare.”201 The Court used the “slip-
pery slope” argument: “we should not treat lightly or disregard the sacred
rights recognized and guarantied [sic] by the Constitution. Were we to sus-
tain the constitutionality of this act, there would be no limit to which the
Legislature might not go in depriving persons of the right to contract in a
lawful way . . . .”202 With this reasoning, the Court effectively turned ra-
tional basis review inside out: rather than inquiring whether there is any set
of facts that can justify the rationality of the law, the Court, in applying its
heightened scrutiny, inquired what evils the Legislature would concoct if
given broad authority under the State’s police power.
In Rathbone, C.R. Rathbone killed an elk on his ranch out of season.203
Rathbone argued the killing was necessary to defend his property, and that
his inalienable right to acquire, possess, and protect property justified the
killing because the elk was causing damage to his ranch.204 The Court used
a standard that expressed a narrow view of the police power, holding that
the law was authorized by the police power “only to the extent reasonably
198. Id. at 38–39.
199. 287 P. 156 (Mont. 1930).
200. Id. at 157, 161.
201. Gateway Mortuaries, 287 P. at 157 (citing Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105,
111–112 (1928)). The “real and substantial relation” standard is a higher standard than rational basis.
202. Id. at 161 (citing Gas Products Co. v. Rankin 207 P. 933, 999 (Mont. 1922)).
203. Rathbone, 100 P.2d at 88.
204. Id. at 88, 90.
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necessary to preserve the public welfare.”205 Thus, the Court applied
“health, safety, and welfare” reasoning under the police power: the State
may only exercise the police power as reasonably necessary to preserve the
health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the State.
In State v. Gleason,206 the Court struck down a law regulating the pro-
fession of photography because it exceeded the scope of the police
power.207 At the outset, the Court considered two possible ways of framing
the police power: first, the health, safety, and welfare concern from Rath-
bone and from courts in other jurisdictions;208 and second, an “arbitrary and
capricious” standard used by the United States Supreme Court.209 In
Gleason, the Court chose the “arbitrary and capricious” standard from
Nebbia v. New York210 without explaining why that was the proper stan-
dard, and struck down the law.211 The Court’s reasoning was not too differ-
ent from the slippery slope reasoning in Gateway Mortuaries: it observed
that “Statutes regulating trades” are so common that they affect “the social
and economic life of the State.”212 As a result, a statute that gives unlimited
licensing authority to a state agency is arbitrary and capricious.213
In Garden Spot Market, Inc. v. Byrne,214 the Court applied rational
basis and struck down a law that imposed a prohibitively high fee on a
certain type of sales promotion.215 The Court stated that the inalienable
rights provision is a “constitutional inhibition upon the police power.”216
The Court did not directly state whether it was following the Nebbia “arbi-
trary and capricious” standard or the health, safety and welfare standard. It
did state the police power could not be used to “operate as the virtual prohi-
bition of a useful and legitimate occupation and business.”217
205. Id. at 92 (emphasis added). Note the lower standard here than the “real and substantial relation”
standard in Gateway Mortuaries. Also note that Rathbone’s action—killing an elk on his ranch—posed
no harm to the public health, safety, or welfare.
206. 277 P.2d 530 (Mont. 1954).
207. Id. at 533.
208. Id. at 531 (“no profession, otherwise lawful, may be regulated unless it directly affects the
public health, safety or morals, or the profession or business is one affected with public interest.” (em-
phasis added)).
209. Id. (citing Nebbia v. N.Y., 291 U.S. 502 (1934)). Under this standard, the State may “regulate
and license professions so long as the exercise of the police power is not arbitrary or capricious and the
means adopted for regulation are reasonably consistent with the ends sought to be obtained. ” Id.
210. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
211. Gleason, 277 P.2d at 531–532. The Court did state that Nebbia “broadened the horizon [of the
police power] but did not relinquish the subject of review . . . .”
212. Id. at 532 (quoting North Carolina v. Harris, 6 S.E.2d 854, 858 (N.C. 1940)).
213. Id. at 533.
214. 378 P.2d 220 (Mont. 1963).
215. Id. at 229.
216. Id. at 227–228.
217. Id. at 229 (quoting Brackman v. Kruse, 199 P.2d 971, 981 (Mont. 1948)).
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In State v. Bernhard,218 the Court held that because the right to a
“clean and healthful environment” in article II, section 3 is an inalienable
right, the State has police power to regulate “to preserve or enhance aes-
thetic values . . . .”219 As a result, the Court upheld an ordinance regulating
automobile junkyards.
In Skurdal II,220 the Court held “[t]he ability to drive a motor vehicle
on a public highway is not a fundamental right; it is a revocable privilege
that is granted upon compliance with statutory licensing procedures.”221
Here, Mr. Skurdal, arguing his own case, urged the Court to rely on an
unenumerated inalienable right, the right to travel, but the Court declined to
do so.222
In Wadsworth and Armstrong, two cases during the Court’s high-water
period of recognition of fundamental rights, the Court did not analyze the
police power in detail. In Wadsworth the Court did not expressly analyze
whether the police power authorized the regulation prohibiting moonlight-
ing; however, the Court in its strict scrutiny analysis implied that the State
did not have a good reason based on public health, safety, or welfare to
justify the regulation.223 In Armstrong, the Court did not analyze whether
the statute in question was authorized by the police power, although the
Court indicated that the right to privacy in making personal health care
decisions and in exercising personal autonomy could be infringed by the
State if it could show a compelling interest for its exercise of the police
power.224
Since that high-water mark, the Court’s holdings (specifically, Wiser
and Montana Cannabis) with respect to the balance between police power
and individual rights have swung in favor of the police power. In Wiser, the
Court held that—unlike in Wadsworth, where Shannon Wadsworth was
“completely proscribed” from moonlighting (and thus the police power was
exceeded)—the denturists “remain free to pursue denture work generally,”
and the regulation “merely requires a dentist’s referral.”225 Then, in Mon-
tana Cannabis, the Court followed Wiser in upholding the police power to
218. 568 P.2d 136 (Mont. 1977).
219. Id. at 138.
220. 767 P.2d 304 (Mont. 1988).
221. Id. at 307.
222. Id.; ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 56, at 39 (“The court has suggested [in Skurdal II] that the
right to travel . . . does not encompass the right to drive on public roads free from government regula-
tion.”).
223. Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1174–1175.
224. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 380. One reason why the police power was not analyzed here is because
the bulk of the holding in the case came under Article II, section 10 of the Montana Constitution (the
right to privacy), which is not limited by a phrase such as “in all lawful ways” and which expressly
requires a showing of a compelling state interest if the right to privacy is infringed.
225. Wiser, 129 P.3d at 139.
31
Bourguignon: Inalienable Rights in Montana
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2016
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\77-1\MON101.txt unknown Seq: 32  9-FEB-16 12:41
36 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 77
regulate and again argued that horticulturalists “remain free to pursue horti-
culture work generally.”226 In none of these recent cases has the Court used
its older formulations of the police power: either the “health, safety and
welfare” formulation from Rathbone or the “arbitrary and capricious” for-
mulation from Gleason. Nor has it used an argument similar to the slippery
slope argument from Gateway Mortuaries. Rather, the Court invented a
simplistic dichotomy between the State “completely proscribing” certain
conduct on the one hand, or the State allowing citizens to “remain free” to
engage, in at least a limited way, in that conduct on the other hand. It is true
that most of the old cases such as Rathbone and Gateway Mortuaries would
be examples of the State “completely proscribing” conduct. Still, the
Court’s new test of police power allows for significant amounts of legisla-
tive interference so long as the State leaves an escape hatch whereby people
“remain free” to do at least some of the conduct in question.
H. “In enjoying these rights, all persons recognize
corresponding responsibilities.”
The Hawaii Constitution of 1950 includes the following inalienable
rights provision:
All persons are free by nature and are equal in their inherent and inalienable
rights. Among these rights are the enjoyment of life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness, and the acquiring and possessing of property. These rights cannot
endure unless the people recognize their corresponding obligations and re-
sponsibilities.227
The “corresponding responsibilities” clause in article II, section 3 was
an addition to the 1972 Constitution. On February 3, 1972, Delegate Propo-
sal No. 116, signed by 18 delegates, proposed deleting the entirety of the
inalienable rights section and replacing it with the following:
All people are free by nature and are equal in their inherent and inalienable
rights. Among these rights are the enjoyment of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. These rights cannot endure unless people recognize their recipro-
cal responsibilities and obligations to secure and preserve these rights and to
protect their property.228
On February 22, 1972, the Bill of Rights Committee Proposal retained
the basic idea of the final sentence of Delegate Proposal No. 116, which
stated: “In enjoying these rights, the people recognize corresponding re-
226. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1166.
227. HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 2 (emphasis added). This provision from the Hawaii Constitution was
reprinted among other materials for the 1972 Constitutional Convention delegates in APPLEGATE, supra
note 73, at 384. It should be noted that the Alaska Constitution—not included among the materials for R
the delegates’ review—also has a similar provision: “all persons have corresponding obligations to the
people and to the State.” ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1.
228. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT I, supra note 92, at 242–243.
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sponsibilities.”229 The Committee’s report included the following statement
about the “corresponding responsibilities” clause:
The final sentence of this section is new having been derived from delegate
proposal No. 116. Testimony was received both favoring and opposing the
inclusion of a statement of corresponding responsibilities in the declaration of
rights. Some expressed the feeling that many were accepting rights without
recognizing that they create obligations. Others were adamant that a declara-
tion of rights should contain just that: the rights of persons against govern-
mental abuses and the rights of minorities against the power of unchecked
majorities. The committee felt that the inclusion of such a statement does not
infringe or impair the rights granted in the declaration of rights but only ac-
cords a tone of responsibility to their exercise.230
Delegate Monroe referenced the Corresponding Responsibilities
Clause as he discussed the “Institutions and Assistance” section of the Con-
stitution:
It seems to me we’ve kind of covered it in our Section 3 of our Bill of Rights.
We’ve suggested there that people have a right to pursue some of the basic
necessities, and in that same section we also are suggesting that the people
have a duty and responsibility—or corresponding responsibility, there—to
take some sort of responsibility—for example, if they are receiving assis-
tance. I don’t agree with the idea that people should have to work for, let’s
say, welfare benefits, and I don’t disagree with it either . . . .231
The Corresponding Responsibilities Clause is paradoxical: it modifies
rights that are “inalienable,” exist prior to government, and cannot be taken
away; yet it asserts that in accepting rights, people have obligations. The
law includes many examples of corresponding responsibilities—in contract
law, the duty to mitigate damages when another party has breached the
contract.232 Does the addition of the Corresponding Responsibilities Clause
imply any such duty on the part of individuals who have suffered a depriva-
tion of their rights? What corresponding responsibility did Shannon Wad-
sworth have when he was terminated after continuing to violate the
agency’s anti-moonlighting rule?
The task of understanding the meaning of this sentence is made more
difficult by the fact that no court cases, in Montana, Hawaii, or Alaska,
have relied on it for their holding. Some cases in Montana have mentioned
the Corresponding Responsibilities Clause in dicta. For instance, Justice
Erdmann in his special concurrence to Wadsworth had this to say:
[T]he inalienable rights set forth in our constitution’s declaration of rights
impart corresponding responsibilities. Delegates to the 1971–72 Constitu-
tional Convention expressed concern that people were accepting rights with-
229. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT II, supra note 114, at 620.
230. Id. at 627.
231. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT VI, supra note 119, at 2294.
232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (1981).
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out recognizing that they create obligations. The convention committee con-
cluded that the inclusion of such a statement would not infringe or impair the
rights granted in the Declaration of Rights but would only accord a tone of
responsibility to their exercise. In this case, the majority has failed to ac-
knowledge any corresponding responsibility on the part of Wadsworth in ex-
ercising his rights.233
Erdmann’s special concurrence implies that, when the Court enforces sub-
stantive rights from article II, section 3, it should be analyzing what corre-
sponding responsibilities, if any, the plaintiffs have. However, the Court has
never done that.
In his majority opinion in Armstrong, Justice Nelson characterized the
“corresponding responsibilities” as a “cost”:
[W]e must also note that each person’s enjoyment of these various constitu-
tional rights is not without a corresponding cost. In fact, Article II, Section 3,
requires that those enjoying the inalienable rights set forth in that section
“recognize corresponding responsibilities.” Whatever may be this cost or cor-
responding responsibility, however, it does not include the demonization of
women who choose to terminate their pregnancies at a time the law allows
nor does it mandate the criminalization of providers of abortion services to
these women. Likewise, this cost does not require the denigration and con-
demnation of those who, as a matter of their own good consciences, either
favor or reject abortion. Most importantly, this cost does not permit the gov-
ernment’s infringement of personal and procreative autonomy in the name of
political ideology.
Rather, the price—the corresponding responsibility—for our commit-
ment to the values and ideals of just government and for our enjoyment of our
individual rights protected by Montana’s Constitution is simply tolerance.
And indeed, that is a token sum for, among other freedoms, the right to be let
alone.234
Nelson’s rhetorical flourishes amount to an assertion that, even if the
Corresponding Responsibilities Clause imposes a cost on individuals, that
cost is small in relation to the deprivation caused by state action such as a
law restricting who may perform abortions. His conclusion—that the “cor-
responding responsibility” is tolerance—makes sense in the context of an
emotionally charged issue such as abortion, but it makes less sense in the
environmental cases, or in the case of Mr. Wadsworth or the denturists.
Should the State Board of Dentistry have shown more tolerance for den-
turists?235 This interpretation, however, does not seem to capture the pur-
pose behind the clause: after all, the people who enjoy the inalienable rights
233. Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1180 (Erdmann, J., specially concurring) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
234. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 383.
235. See Wiser, 129 P.3d at 136 (“The long staruggle between denturists and dentists is well docu-
mented . . . the battle at its core is the regulation of the denturity profession by the State Board of
Dentistry, which, in the eyes of the denturists, is dominated by dentists who actively oppose denturity.”).
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(the denturists) are the people who must recognize corresponding responsi-
bilities. What should the denturists have done? Should Mr. Wadsworth have
stopped moonlighting in order to recognize his corresponding responsibili-
ties? If so, he’d simply be declining to “enjoy” his rights. It is difficult to
find the balance where Mr. Wadsworth could have simultaneously enjoyed
his rights and also recognized a corresponding responsibility.
The use of the term “corresponding,” and the fact of its use in Hawaii
and Alaska, implies that whatever the responsibility is, it should be roughly
proportionate to the “value” of the right being enforced. Because the
Court’s enforcement of inalienable rights appears to have receded from its
high-water mark of in the late 1990s, it appears unlikely that subsequent
courts will analyze the Corresponding Responsibilities Clause as central to
the holding of future cases.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court had some very good reasons for enforcing C.J. Rathbone’s
inalienable right to defend his property and Shannon Wadsworth’s right to
the opportunity to pursue employment. The Court had equally good reasons
for not enforcing Rodney Skurdal’s right to travel on Montana’s highways
without a license. On the one hand, Mr. Rathbone and Mr. Wadsworth were
sympathetic litigants: they were both able to argue that their actions in vio-
lation of state law were undertaken out of necessity. On the other hand, Mr.
Skurdal wished to use his inalienable rights as a shield against any govern-
ment regulation whatsoever.
The Court’s interpretation of the inalienable rights provision has been
inconsistent, and there is little guidance as to what the future will hold for
this provision. Clearly, the Court has preferred to enforce the rights that are
enumerated within the provision rather than recognizing new, unenumer-
ated rights. It is also clear the Court has not treated inalienable rights any
differently than other fundamental rights listed in article II of the Montana
Constitution; or, if they are different from the rest of article II, inalienable
rights may be more subject to the police power and thus less effective as
individual rights. Any litigants who seek to have their inalienable rights
recognized by the Court should be prepared to make arguments as to the
following elements: (1) why the Court must reach the constitutional issue,
or why other adequate remedies do not exist, (2) why the specific conduct
at issue is “within” the right, (3) what evidence demonstrates that the right
was infringed, and (4) whether the statute or regulation at issue is author-
ized by the State’s police power. Even though the Delegates to the Montana
Constitutional Convention attempted to argue all Montanans into liking the
same glass of beer—that is, the same list of inalienable rights—the Court
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does not view inalienable rights as universal, God-given rights. Ironically,
we must argue even more strenuously when we assert our inalienable rights.
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